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Abstract
More than five years after the onset of the Asian crisis, the characteristics of the exchange rate
regimes of East Asian economies remain a topic of considerable discussion.  The purpose of this paper is
to investigate what affected the values of three ASEAN currencies, the Malaysia ringgit, the Singapore
dollar, and the Thai baht after the crisis.  The particular interest in our analysis is to explore why the East
Asian currencies, which temporarily reduced correlations with the U.S. dollar after the crisis, had a
tendency to revert back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s.  Based on high-
frequency day-to-day observations, we examine how and when these three ASEAN currencies changed
their correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  Before September
1st 1998, these currencies increased correlations with the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  In
particular, the increased correlations were larger than theoretical correlations based on the trade weights.
The increase in correlations with the Japanese yen was, however, temporary.  After Malaysia adopted the
fixed exchange rate, both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased correlations with the U.S.
dollar drastically and began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.  A part of the change
was attributable to asymmetric responses to the yen-dollar exchange rate.  The change was, however,
explained quite well by the strong linkage among the ASEAN countries.  This implies that a regime
switch in Malaysia had an enormously large impact on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries
in the post-crisis period.
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1. Introduction
  More than five years after the onset of the Asian crisis, the characteristics of the exchange rate regimes
of East Asian economies remain a topic of considerable discussion.  In the pre-crisis period, it was fairly
evident that currencies of most East Asian economies maintained de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar.
Among the East Asian economies, Hong Kong was the only East Asian economy that adopted the fixed
exchange rate regime backed by a currency board arrangement.  It was, however, well known that
currencies in the other East Asian economies had maintained highly stable values against the U.S. dollar
since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Frankel and Wei (1994), Kwan (1995), Goldberg and Klein
(1997), and McKinnon (2001)).
1  
For example, Table 1 reports the estimated weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the pre-
crisis East Asian currencies by Frankel-Wei and Kwan.  From the table, we can easily see that the
weights of the U.S. dollar were close to one and those of the Japanese yen were negligible for the
Korean won, the Indonesian rupiah, the Philippine peso, and the Thai baht.  The weights of U.S. dollar
were smaller than 0.9 and those of the Japanese yen were not negligible for the Singapore dollar and the
Malaysia ringgit.  However, even for these currencies, the weights of U.S. dollar had dominant weights.
The results were almost stable from the 1980s to the early 1990s.
2
  The de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilized the real “effective” exchange rates of these
currencies in the pre-crisis period.  In particular, as the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar
from April 1995 to the summer of 1997, appreciation of the real “effective” exchange rates reduced the
export competitiveness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian economies（see, for
example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), and Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998)）.  Several
economists have, thus, proposed the desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in East Asia that
might stabilize their effective exchange rates (see, for example, Bénassy-Quéré (1999), Williamson
(1999, 2000), Rajan (2002)).
3  The post-crisis experience in East Asia, however, taught us that the road
to the intermediate exchange rate regimes in the region is still pretty hard.
4
                                                       
1 Takagi (1996) is an exceptional study that found some significant correlations between the East Asian
currencies and the Japanese yen during this period.
2 The U.S. dollar had also been dominant in various international transactions in East Asia.  See, for
example, Ito (1993), Fukuda (1995), and Kawai (1996).
3 The bipolar or two-corner solution view of exchange rates states that intermediate policy regimes
between hard pegs and floating are not sustainable.  Fischer (2001), however, argued that the proponents
of the bipolar view have probably exaggerated their point. 
4 Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (2000, 2001) showed that on economic criteria, ASEAN appears
less suited for a regional currency arrangement than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty, although the
difference is not large.2
In the post-crisis period, Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan
virtually maintained its peg to the U.S. dollar.  After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia
started pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998.  In contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea as
well as the Philippines and Taiwan have adopted managed float since the crisis.  After going through
steep devaluations and high volatility in 1997-98, their currencies have mostly stabilized over the past
couple of years.  Hernández and Montiel (2001) have suggested that they are now allowed to float more
at low frequencies than before 1997-98.  Some other observers, however, have argued that the so-called
floating exchange regimes of the countries are not really floating when we look at high-frequency day-
to-day observations (Kawai and Akiyama (2000), McKinnon (2001), and McKinnon and Schnabl
(2002)).  In particular, using a regression framework from Fankel and Wei (1994), they have interpreted
that the East Asian currencies are reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.
5
The purpose of this paper is to investigate why the East Asian currencies, which temporarily reduced
correlations with the U.S. dollar after the crisis, had a tendency to revert back to de facto pegs against the
U.S. dollar in the late 1990s.  During the crisis, several East Asian economies shifted their exchange rate
regimes from de facto U.S. Dollar pegs to managed float.  However, except for Malaysia, the East Asian
economies had no institutional switch of exchange rate regimes in the post-crisis period.  It is thus far
from clear why the East Asian currencies reverted back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar in the late
1990s.
Based on high-frequency day-to-day observations, we examine how and when three ASEAN
currencies, the Malaysia ringgit, the Singapore dollar, and the Thai baht, changed their correlations with
the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  Before September 1st 1998, these
currencies increased correlations with the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  In particular, the
increased correlations were larger than theoretical correlations based on the trade weights.  However,
after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate, both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased
correlations with the U.S. dollar drastically and began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S.
dollar.  
One possible factor that may explain the structural change is a change of macroeconomic correlations
that could alter the correlations of East Asian exchange rates with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.
Throughout the late 1990s, the U.S. economy was booming, while the Japanese economy experienced a
long stagnation.  Since East Asian economies had started a sharp recovery from the crisis around the
middle of 1998, macroeconomic fundamentals in the East Asian economies thus had a strong positive
                                                       
5  Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that many emerging market countries that say they allow their
exchange rate to float mostly do not.3
correlation with those of Japan in the first half of 1998 but with those of the United States after the latter
half of 1998.  To the extent that macroeconomic fundamentals affect exchange rates, the change of
macroeconomic correlations may explain part of exchange rate movements in the East Asian economies
in the late 1990s.  However, since the change of macroeconomic correlations was gradual, it cannot
explain why several ASEAN currencies had drastic structural changes for a short period.  We thus need
an alternative answer to explain why the East Asian currencies reverted back to de facto pegs against the
U.S. dollar for a short period.
The main conclusion of this paper is that a regime switch in Malaysia had an enormously large impact
on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries in the post-crisis period.  A policy change in one
country generally has an impact on the exchange rate in the other country when their economic linkage
is tight.  It is thus highly possible that the regime switch in Malaysia on September 1st 1998 had a strong
impact on the exchange rates in its neighboring countries and that the affected exchange rates had
another impacts on the exchange rates in another neighboring countries.  Our empirical studies support
this view and suggest that the exchange rate linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis
ASEAN countries had a tendency reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 considers the theoretical determinants of exchange rates
under a currency basket regime in East Asia.  After reviewing the post-crisis exchange regimes in
Malaysia in section 3, sections 4 and 5 investigate how large impacts the regime switch in Malaysia had
on the post-crisis exchange regimes in Singapore and Thailand respectively.  Section 6 explores how
robust our results are when allowing some structural changes in the yen-dollar exchange rate in the late
1990s.  Section 7 examines the impacts of the Malaysian regime switch on the post-crisis exchange
regimes in Korea and the Philippines.  Section 8 summarizes our main results and refers to their
implications.      
2. The Trade Weighted Currency Basket Regime
  In order to analyze the interdependence of exchange rates in East Asian economies, this section
theoretically considers the determinants of exchange rates under a currency basket regime.  For
analytical simplicity, we suppose that the Singapore dollar is determined by a basket of the U.S. dollar,
the Japanese yen, and the Malaysia ringgit.  All of the exchange rates are denominated by a common
numéraire currency such as the Swiss Franc.  Denoting the nominal exchange rates of the U.S. dollar, the
Japanese yen, the Singapore dollar, and the Malaysia ringgit by USDt, JPYt, SDt, and MRt respectively,
the growth rate of Singapore dollar is thus written as4
(1)   ∆SDt = a1*∆USDt + a2*∆JPYt + a3*∆MRt + εt,
where ∆Et is the growth rate of an exchange rate Et, and εt is a disturbance term.
  If the growth rate of the Malaysia ringgit (∆MRt) is determined by 
(2)   ∆MRt = b1*∆USDt + b2*∆JPYt + b3*∆SDt + ηt,
where ηt is a disturbance term, equations (1) and (2) therefore lead to
t t t JPY  
b3 * a3 - 1
b2 * a3 a2
      USD  
b3 * a3 - 1
b1 * a3 a1




= ∆  + υt
t t t JPY  
b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a2 b2
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b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a1 b1




= ∆ R  + ζt
where υt ≡ (εt +a3*ηt)/(1-a3*b3) and ζt ≡(b3*εt +ηt)/(1-a3*b3).
  To the extent that εt and ηt are independent of ∆USDt and ∆JPYt, equation (3) indicates that how the
Singapore dollar is correlated with the U.S. dollar and with the Japanese yen depends not only the basket
weights of the Singapore dollar in (1) but also on the basket weights of the Malaysia ringgit in (2).  Thus,
even if Singapore keeps its basket weights constant, the regime switch of the Malaysian exchange rate
policy can have a significant impact on the Singapore dollar, particular when a3 is large.
  For example, suppose that the basket weights of the Singapore dollar are based on trade weights among
five major trade partners.  Then, noting that the Hong Kong dollar is fixed to the U.S. dollar, Singapore’s
trade weights in 1997 imply the basket weights that a1=0.4131, a2=0.2205, and a3=0.2871.  Therefore,
if the weights of the Malaysia ringgit are also based on the trade weights among five major trade partners
in 1997, that is, b1=0.2896, b2=0.2830, and b3=0.2833, then equations (3) and (4) lead to theoretical
correlations.  Table 3-(1) summarizes the calculated theoretical correlations among the exchange rates
before Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate.
6  It indicates that both the Malaysia ringgit and the
Singapore dollar have slightly larger correlation with the U.S. dollar than with the Japanese yen.  The
weights of the Japanese yen, however, amount to more than 0.3 in both currencies, which are much
larger than the estimated weights in the pre-crisis period.
  In contrast, when the Malaysia ringgit is fixed to the U.S. dollar, it holds that ∆MRt ＝∆USDt, that is,
                                                       
6 The values of a1 and b1 are calculated by the sum of the trade weights to the U.S.A and those to Hong
Kong.5
b1=1, and b2=b3=0.  Substituting the trade weights in 1997, 1998, and 1999 into equations (3) and (4)
respectively, we can obtain Table 3-(2).  The table summarizes theoretical correlations of the Singapore
dollar with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate.
  Comparing the theoretical correlations in Table 3-(2) with those in Table 3-(1), the weight of the U.S.
dollar rose from 0.54 to 0.7, while the weight of the Japanese yen declined from 0.328 to 0.2.  This
implies that the switch of the Malaysian exchange rate regime had significant impacts on the theoretical
correlations of the Singapore dollar.  It is noteworthy that these changes occurred even if Singapore did
not switch its exchange rate regime.  Instead, these changes are attributable to the high degree of
interdependence of the Singapore dollar to the Malaysia ringgit.
3. The Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes in Malaysia
  On September 1st 1998, the Malaysian government shifted its exchange rate regime from managed
float to the fix exchange rate.  The regime shift was the only drastic regime switch in the post-crisis East
Asian economies.  However, before shifting the fixed exchange rate regime, Malaysia adopted managed
float after the crisis.  The purpose of this section is to estimate how large correlations the post-crisis
Malaysia ringgit had with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen before September 1st 1998.  
After the Thai crisis in July 1997, Malaysia experienced serious devaluation of its currency.   During
the crisis, the market value of the Malaysia ringgit had dropped to half of the pre-crisis level until
January 1998.  It was after the end of January 1998 when the Malaysian ringgit almost stabilized  (see
Figure 1).  After the Malaysian ringgit stabilized, the Malaysian government began to explore a new
economic policy, including the stabilization policy of real effective exchange rates of the ringgit.  For
example, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), which was established by Prime Minister
Mahathir in December 1997, announced the National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) in August 1998.
The plan stressed the importance of stabilizing the real “effective” exchange rates and proposed the
adoption of a trade weighted basket system as a desirable exchange rate regime.  The plan is based on
the idea that the de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilize the real “effective” exchange
rates.
  In order to investigate the determinants of the ringgit during this period, we use the method of Frankel-
Wei to estimate the weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the Malaysia ringgit before
September 1st 1998.  In this approach, an independent currency is chosen as an arbitrary numéraire for
measuring the exchange variation.  The goal here is to estimate the weight a currency assigns to another
currency on a given frequency.  The regression model, where the local currency’s value against the
independent currency is regressed against the major world currencies, is 6
(5)  ∆MRt = constant term + α1*∆USDt + α2*∆JPYt + α3*∆DMt,
where ∆Et is the growth rate of an exchange rate Et.
  The data of each currency’s exchange rate is the daily data at 11a.m. in the Tokyo market.  Using the
Swiss Franc as a numéraire, we estimated equation (5) by the ordinary least square with and without
∆DMt.  Table 4 reports the estimation results for three alternative sample periods; (i) from the beginning
of January 1998 to the end of August 1998, (ii) from the beginning of March 1998 to the end of August
1998, (iii) from the beginning of July 1998 to the end of August 1998.  The results clearly show that
regardless of the choice of ∆DMt and the sample period, the Japanese yen had kept much larger weights
than the U.S. dollar during this post-crisis period.  
  The estimated weight of the yen was largest for the sample period from January 1998 to August 1998.
For this period, the estimated weight of the yen was close to 0.9, while the estimated weight of the U.S.
dollar was positive but not statistically significant.  The adjusted R
2, however, was less than 0.2,
implying that the yen and the U.S. dollar explain only small part of the ringgit’s fluctuations during this
period. 
  In contrast, the adjusted R
2 rose up to 0.55 for the sample period from July 1998 to August 1998.   This
implies that during this period, the yen and the U.S. dollar came to explain significant part of the
ringgit’s fluctuations.  For this sample period, the estimated weight of the yen was approximately equal
to 0.5, while the estimated weight of the U.S. dollar was approximately equal to 0.3.  Compared with the
other sample period, the estimated weight of the yen was modest for this period.  However, even for this
modest period, the estimated weight of the yen was larger than the theoretical weight in Table 3-(i),
while that of the U.S. dollar was much smaller than the theoretical weight in Table 3-(i).  This suggests
that the Malaysian ringgit had a temporal but drastic increase in the weight of the yen before adapting to
the fixed exchange rate in the post-crisis period.    
4. Determinants of the Singapore Dollar after the Crisis
  Compared with the other ASEAN countries, Singapore experienced relatively modest devaluation of its
currency during the crisis.  Singapore thus kept the exchange regime of a basket system before and after
the crisis.  In the pre-crisis period, the U.S. dollar had a dominant weight in the currency basket of the
Singapore dollar, although the weight of the Japanese yen was also significantly positive.  The estimated
weight of the U.S. dollar in the pre-crisis period was much larger than the theoretical weight calculated
by the trade weights.  However, in the post-crisis period, the other ASEAN countries shifted their7
exchange rate regimes from de facto U.S. dollar pegs to managed float.  It is thus possible that there
were some structural changes in the basket weights of the Singapore dollar in the post-crisis period.
  The purpose of this section is to investigate how the Singapore dollar changed the weights of the U.S.
dollar and the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  The particular interest of the analysis is to
investigate how the regime shifts of the Malaysia ringgit affected the weights of the U.S. dollar and the
Japanese yen in the post-crisis Singapore dollar.  As we have shown in the last section, the Malaysia
ringgit had a temporary but drastic increase in the weight of the Japanese yen in 1998 before adopting
the fixed exchange rate on September 1st 1998.  Since Malaysia is the second largest trade partner for
Singapore, it is highly possible that the changes of the Malaysian exchange rate policy had strong
impacts on the movements on the Singapore dollar.
In order to investigate the determinants of the Singapore dollar, we estimate 
(6)  ∆SDt = constant term + β1*∆USDt + β2*∆JPYt + β3*∆DMt,
by the ordinary least square.  The exchange rates, for which the Swiss Franc is used as a numéraire, are
the daily data at 11a.m. in the Tokyo market.  The sample periods of estimations are (i) from the
beginning of January 1998 to the end of August 1998, (ii) from the beginning of March 1998 to the end
of August 1998, (iii) from the beginning of July 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iv) from the beginning
of September 1998 to the end of October 1998, (v) from the beginning of September 1998 to the end of
December 1998, and (vi) from the beginning of September 1998 to the end of December 1999.  The first
three sample periods are those before September 1st 1998, while the latter three sample periods are those
after September 1st 1998.  Comparing the estimation results for two types of sample periods, we can
examine how strong impacts the Malaysian regime swift on September 1st 1998 had on the determinants
of the Singapore dollar.
  Table 5 summarizes the estimation results with and without ∆DMt in an explanatory variable.  For the
sample periods before September 1st 1998, we can easily see that the Japanese yen had larger weights
than the U.S. dollar.  That is, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar was approximately equal to 0.4, while that
of the Japanese yen took the values from 0.6 to 0.65.  The estimation results are highly stable throughout
the sample periods.  The results indicate that corresponding the regime shifts of the other ASEAN
countries, Singapore increased the weight of the Japanese yen in its currency basket after the crisis.
However, the estimation results for the sample periods after September 1st 1998 show that such a
increase of the weight was only temporary.  That is, after September 1st 1998, the coefficient of the U.S.
dollar took the values from 0.6 to 0.8, while the coefficient of the Japanese yen declined less than 0.2. 8
The coefficients are almost equivalent to those in the pre-crisis period that were reported in Table 1.  The
results imply that the weights in the currency basket returned to the pre-crisis levels after Malaysia
adopted the fixed exchange rate.  
The implication seems supported more strongly when we compare the estimates from July 1998 to
August 1998 with those from September 1998 to October 1998.  The comparison of the estimates with
two short sample periods shows how drastic the change happened around September 1st 1998.  That is,
the coefficient of the U.S. dollar was only around 0.4 from July to August.  But it rose up to about 0.7
from September to October, which is not so different from any other estimates after September 1st 1998.
Conversely, the coefficient of the Japanese yen was around 0.6 from July to August, but it dropped
below 0.2 from September to October.
It is noteworthy that the estimated weight of the yen (the U.S. dollar) was larger (smaller) than the
theoretical weight in Table 3-(i) before September 1st 1998, while that of the yen (the U.S. dollar) was
much smaller (larger) than the theoretical weight in Table 3-(ii) after September 1st 1998.  The estimated
weight of the yen (the U.S. dollar) was larger (smaller) before September 1st 1998 partly because the
Malaysia ringgit put higher weight on the yen than its theoretical level.  However, even if we calculate
the theoretical correlations of the Singapore dollar based on the estimated correlations of the ringgit in
Table 4, we can still see that the estimated weight of the yen (the U.S. dollar) was larger (smaller) than
the theoretical weight. 
For example, Table 6 reports the theoretical weights in the Singapore dollar based on the estimated
weights in the ringgit from the beginning of January 1998 to the end of August 1998 and from the
beginning of July 1998 to the end of August 1998.  In both periods, the theoretical weights were
calculated based on the trade weights in 1997 and 1998.  The calculated weights show that the U.S.
dollar still has larger weight than the Japanese yen in three cases and that the U.S. dollar has marginally
smaller weight than the Japanese yen in one case.  In all cases, the estimated weight of the yen (the U.S.
dollar) in Table 5 was larger (smaller) than its theoretical weight. This implies that a regime switch in
Malaysia had an enormously large impact on the Singapore dollar in the post-crisis period.
  
5. Determinants of Thai Baht after the Crisis
(1) The analytical motivation
After the speculative attack in July 2nd 1997, Thailand started adopting managed float.  Under the
managed float, the Thai baht first experienced serious devaluation and its market value had dropped to
half of the pre-crisis level until January 1998.  After the end of January 1998, the Thai baht, however,
stabilized gradually.  9
The purpose of this section is to estimate how large correlations the Thai baht had with the U.S. dollar
and the Japanese yen after January 1998.  In the analysis, we assume that the Thai baht is determined by
the weighted average of major currencies.  Strictly speaking, this may not be an appropriate assumption
because Thailand did not adopt an explicit currency basket.  However, even under managed floats, the
exchange rate tends to be affected by exchange rates of major trade partners.  The assumption may thus
hold as an approximation.
Before estimating the actual correlations, we first calculate the theoretical weights in the Thai baht.
Suppose that the Thai baht is determined by the weighted average of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen,
the Singapore dollar, and the Malaysia ringitt.  Then, the growth rate of the Thai baht (∆TBt) is written
as
 (7)  ∆TBt = c1*∆USDt + c2*∆JPYt+ c3*∆SDt  + c4*∆MRt + µt.
  Substituting (3) and (4) into (7), we obtain
 (8)  ∆TBt = (c1+c3*d1+c4*e1)* ∆USDt + (c2+c3*d2+c4*e2)* ∆JPYt+ λt
where d1=
b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a1 b1+
, d2=   
b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a2 b2+
, e1=  
b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a1 b1
 
+
, e2=  
b3 * a3 - 1
b3 * a2 b2+
, and λt = µt + c3*υt +
c4*ζt.
  To the extent that ∆SDt  and ∆MRt are independent of µt, it is natural to assume that the disturbance
term λt is independent of ∆USDt and ∆JPYt.
7  Under this assumption, we can thus obtain the theoretical
weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the Thai baht.  Table 7-(1) reports the calculated
theoretical weights before Malaysia shifted to the fixed exchange rate regime based on the trade weights
among five major trade partners in 1997.  It shows that the Japanese yen had a slightly higher theoretical
weight than the U.S. dollar before Malaysia shifted to the fixed exchange rate regime.
Table 7-(2) reports the calculated theoretical weights after Malaysia shifted to the fixed exchange rate
regime, that is, when b1=1、and b2=b3=0.  The weights are calculated for three alternative cases based
on the trade weights among five major trade partners in 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively.  In all cases,
the weight of the Japanese yen became smaller than that of the U.S. dollar.  The decline of the weight of
                                                       
7  Strictly speaking, this is not an appropriate assumption because Thailand is the fifth largest trade
partner for Singapore,.  However, since the trade weight is 8%, the bias caused by this assumption will
be small.10
the yen was more conspicuous when we used the trade weights in 1998 and 1999.
(2) The Estimations of the actual weights
  We next estimate the actual weights in the Thai bath after the crisis.  As in the previous sections, we
estimate 
(9)  ∆TBt = constant term + γ1*∆USDt + γ2*∆JPYt + γ3*∆DMt,
by the ordinary least square.  The exchange rates, for which the Swiss Franc is used as a numéraire, are
the daily data at 11a.m. in the Tokyo market.  As in the last section, the sample periods of estimations are
(i) from the beginning of January 1998 to the end of August 1998, (ii) from the beginning of March 1998
to the end of August 1998, (iii) from the beginning of July 1998 to the end of August 1998, (iv) from the
beginning of September 1998 to the end of October 1998, (v) from the beginning of September 1998 to
the end of December 1998, and (vi) from the beginning of September 1998 to the end of December
1999.  Comparing the estimation results for two types of sample periods, we can examine how strong
impacts the Malaysian regime shift on September 1st 1998 had on the determinants of the Thai baht.
  Table 8 summarizes the estimation results with and without ∆DMt in an explanatory variable.  For the
sample period from January 1998 to August 1998 or from March 1998 to August 1998, we can see that
the Japanese yen had larger weights than the U.S. dollar.  In those cases, the coefficient of the Japanese
yen was approximately equal to 0.7, while that of the U.S. dollar was not statistically significant.  The
estimated weight of the yen (the U.S. dollar) was much larger (smaller) than the theoretical weight in
Table 7-(i).  The results indicate that the Thai baht drastically increased the weight of the Japanese yen
after the crisis.
  In contrast, for the sample period from July 1998 to August 1998, we can see that the weight of the
Japanese yen became slightly smaller than that of the U.S. dollar.  In particular, the estimated weight of
the yen (the U.S. dollar) became smaller (larger) than the theoretical weight in Table 7-(i).  The results
indicate that in case of Thailand, the weight of the Japanese yen declined and the weight of the U.S.
dollar had risen even before September 1st 1998.
  However, the changes of the weights were more drastic after September 1st 1998.  That is, for the
sample period from September 1998 to October 1998, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar rose up to more
than 0.9, while the coefficient of the Japanese yen declined less than 0.1.  The coefficients are almost
equivalent to those in the pre-crisis period that were reported in Table 1.  The results imply that the
weights in the currency basket returned to the pre-crisis levels after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange11
rate.  
  
6. Asymmetric Impacts of the Yen/Dollar Rate on East Asian Exchange Rates
  Until the last sections, we have shown that both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht placed quite
different weights on the yen and the US dollar before and after September 1st 1998.  The adoption of the
fixed exchange rate by the Malaysian government was the only big institutional regime shift around
September 1st 1998.  The results thus suggest that the regime shift of the Malaysian exchange rate had a
strong impact on the determinants of the Singapore dollar and the Thai bath in the post-crisis period.
  However, we need to note that in 1998, the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate had a big structural
break.  Figure 2 draws movements of the yen/dollar exchange rates from January 1994 to December
2001.  It shows that the yen steadily depreciated against the U.S. dollar and that the rate of depreciation
was accelerated after November 1997.  The trend of the depreciation had continued until the end of July
1998.  However, after August 1998, the yen, in turn, started appreciating against the U.S. dollar and that
the appreciation had continued until the end of December 1999.  This indicates that if the Singapore
dollar and the Thai baht had asymmetric responses to appreciation and depreciation of the yen/dollar
exchange rates, they could have had different correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen
before and after August 1998.  
  The purpose of this section is to investigate whether the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht showed
different responses to appreciation and depreciation of the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  We
first investigate the existence of asymmetric responses by estimating the following equations:
(10)  ∆SDt = constant + β1*∆USDt + β2*∆JPYt + β12*D*∆USDt + β22*D*∆JPYt + β3*∆DMt,
(11)  ∆TBt = constant + γ1*∆USDt + γ2*∆JPYt + γ12*D*∆USDt + γ22*D*∆JPYt + γ3*∆DMt,
where Dt is a dummy variable which takes one when the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar
but takes zero otherwise.
 The sample period of estimations is from September 1998 to December 1999 when the Japanese yen
had a tendency to appreciate against the U.S. dollar.  Table 9 summarizes the estimation results with and
without ∆DMt.  In all cases, variables without the dummy had similar estimated coefficients to those in
Tables 5 and 8.  In contrast, the U.S. dollar multiplied by the dummy variable had negative sign and the
Japanese yen multiplied by the dummy variable had positive sign.  This implies that the Singapore dollar
and the Thai bath had smaller responses to the U.S. dollar and larger responses to the Japanese yen when
the yen depreciates against the U.S. dollar.  The estimated coefficients of the U.S. dollar with the dummy12
variable took the values around –0.3 and were marginally significant.  The estimated coefficients of
Japanese yen with the dummy variable were, however, very small and were far from significant.
  We next estimated equations (6) and (9) for the sample period from January 2000 to December 2001.
We chose this sample period because the yen/dollar exchange rates had a tendency to depreciate
throughout the period.  If the asymmetric responses to the yen/dollar exchange rates were important, the
estimated correlations would be similar to those for the post-crisis period before September 1998.  Table
10 reports the estimation results with and without ∆DMt as an explanatory variable.  In the case of
Singapore, the estimated coefficients are significantly different from those for the post-crisis period
before September 1998.  Instead, the estimated coefficients are almost similar to those after September
1998 that were reported in Table 5.  Even in the case of Thailand, the estimated coefficients are
significantly different from those for the post-crisis period before September 1998.  However, in the case
of Thai baht, the U.S. dollar had smaller coefficients and the Japanese yen had large coefficients than the
other estimates after September 1998 that were reported in Table 8.  This implies that the Thai baht had
smaller responses to the U.S. dollar and larger to the Japanese yen from January 2000 to December
2001when the yen depreciates against the U.S. dollar.  
 The above overall results show some marginal evidence that the Singapore dollar and the Thai bath had
smaller correlations with the U.S. dollar and larger correlations with the yen when the yen depreciates
against the U.S. dollar.  The results are, however, not so definitive and far from explaining why large
structural changes were observed before and after September 1st 1998. 
7.  The Post-Crisis Exchange Rates in Korea and the Philippines
Concerning the impacts on the exchange rates, Korea and the Philippines also experienced serious
devaluations of their currencies during the East Asian crisis.  The arrival of the Korean won crisis was
late and it was November 1997 when the currency showed a sharp devaluation.  In contrast, the
Philippine peso had already experienced frequent exchange rate depreciation before the East Asian
crisis.  However, both the Korean won and the Philippine peso reduced their market values to half of the
pre-crisis levels until January 1998.  Like the other East Asian currencies, it was after the end of January
1998 when these currencies almost stabilized.  
The purpose of this section is to examine what impacts the Malaysian regime switch had on the
Korean won and the Philippine peso.  Concerning economic interdependence, Malaysia has had smaller
linkages with Korea and the Philippines than with Singapore and Thailand.  For example, when we look
at the trade linkage, we can easily see that the dominant trade partners have been the United States and
Japan for Korea and the Philippines.  This indicates that intra-regional linkages with the other East Asian13
countries, particularly with Malaysia have been less important for Korea and the Philippines.  It is thus
far from clear what impacts the Malaysian regime switch had on the Korean won and the Philippine
peso.
  As in the previous sections, we estimate the following equations:
(12)  ∆KWt = constant + β1*∆USDt + β2*∆JPYt + β3*∆DMt,
(13)  ∆PPt = constant + γ1*∆USDt + γ2*∆JPYt + γ3*∆DMt,
where ∆KWt and ∆PPt denote the growth rates of the Korean won and the Philippine peso denominated
by the Swiss franc respectively.  
The sample period of estimations is from the beginning of January 1998 to December 1998.  To
examine the impacts of the Malaysian regime switch, we split the sample before and after September 1st
1998.  Tables 11 and 12 summarize the estimation results for Korea and the Philippines respectively.
The tables report the results both with and without ∆DMt.  Throughout the periods, the U.S. dollar had
larger weights than the Japanese yen.  However, in most of the estimates, the coefficient of the Japanese
yen was greater than 0.2 and statistically significant.  This indicates that both Korea and the Philippines
increased the weight of the Japanese yen in its currency basket after the crisis.
Comparing the coefficients before and after September 1st 1998, the coefficient of the U.S. dollar
becomes close to one and that of the Japanese yen drops down after September 1st 1998.  This suggests
that the currencies had some moderate reversions to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.  However,
comparing the estimates from July 1998 to August 1998 with those from September 1998 to October
1998, we can see no such structural change in the Korean Won.  In the case of the Philippines Peso, we
can see some structural change.  The change is, however, less drastic than what we observed for the
Singapore dollar and the Thai Baht during the same period.  This implies that in the case of the Korean
won and the Philippine peso, the moderate reversions to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar are not
attributable to the Malaysian regime shift on September 1st 1998. 
8. Concluding remarks
  In this paper, we investigated the determinants of three ASEAN currencies, the Malaysia ringgit, the
Singapore dollar, and the Thai baht after the crisis.  In particular, we examined how these three ASEAN
currencies had correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the post-crisis period.  We found
that before September 1st 1998, these currencies increased correlations with the Japanese yen in the
post-crisis period.  In particular, the increased correlations were larger than the theoretical correlations14
that were calculated based on the trade weights.  The increased correlations with the Japanese yen were,
however, temporary in the post-crisis period.   We found that after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange
rate, both the Singapore dollar and the Thai baht increased correlation with the U.S. dollar drastically
and began reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar.
  One possible answer to explain the structural change is a change of macroeconomic correlations that
altered correlations of East Asian exchange rates with the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen.  Since East
Asian economies had started a sharp recovery from the crisis around the middle of 1998, macroeconomic
fundamentals in the East Asian economies may have a positive correlation with those of Japan in the
first half of 1998 but with those of the United States after the latter half of 1998.  Our regression results
also showed that a part of the change was attributable to the structural change of the yen-dollar exchange
rate.  
Our main results, however, suggested that the structural change was explained well by the strong
linkage among the ASEAN countries and that a regime switch in Malaysia had an enormously large
impact on the exchange rates of the other ASEAN countries in the post-crisis period.  This implies the
importance of regional cooperation among the East Asian countries.  Without regional cooperation, the
East Asian countries might come to adopt the exchange rate regime that does not necessarily contribute
to economic stability in the region.
In the present period, several East Asian economies adopt different types of exchange rate regimes;
Hong Kong kept its currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtually maintained its peg to the
U.S. dollar.  After experiencing some transitional regime, Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on
September 1st 1998.  In contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea as well as the Philippines and Taiwan
have adopted managed float since the crisis.  The so-called floating exchange regimes of these countries
are not really floating.  The de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar may destabilize the real “effective” exchange
rates of these currencies.  To avoid another crisis in East Asia, it is an urgent issue to reconsider what is
the desirable exchange rate regime in East Asian from a view of regional cooperation.  15
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Option, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Table 1.  TheWeights of the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen in the Pre-crisis Period
  Frankel & Wei (1994)              Kwan (1995)
        weekly data        monthly data         weekly data     
Currencies 1979.1 -1992.5 1991.1- 1995.5 1995.1- 1995.8
US $  Yen US $  Yen US $  Yen
Kora Won 0.96 -0.01 0.94 0.06 0.84 0.17
Singapore Dollar 0.75 0.13 0.69 0.1 0.74 0.18
Malaysia Ringgit 0.78 0.07 0.84 0.04 0.87 0.16
Indonesia Rupia 0.95 0.16 0.99 0 0.97 0.01
Philipphine Peso 1.07 -0.01 1.15 -0.24 1.07 0.02
Thai Baht 0.91 0.05 0.82 0.1 0.86 0.09
Table 2. Trade Weights by Country in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (Top 5)
(1) Malaysia
1997 1998 1999
country weight country weight country weight
1st U.S.A. 28.96% U.S.A. 35.58% U.S.A. 34.08%
2nd Singapore 28.33% Singapore 26.49% Japan 26.71%
3rd Japan 28.30% Japan 24.98% Singapore 26.33%
4th Taiwan 7.45% Korea 6.55% Korea 6.72%
5th Korea 6.95% Hong Kong 5.96% Hong Kong 6.17%
(2) Singapore
1997 1998 1999
country weight country weight country weight
1st U.S.A. 31.24% U.S.A. 34.32% U.S.A. 32.43%
2nd Malaysia 28.71% Malaysia 27.38% Malaysia 28.65%
3rd Japan 22.05% Japan 20.47% Japan 21.33%
4th Hong Kong 10.07% Hong Kong 10.19% Hong Kong 9.47%
5th Thailand 7.94% Thailand 7.65% Thailand 8.12%
(3) Thailand
1997 1998 1999
country weight country weight country weight
1st Japan 38.78% U.S.A. 36.08% Japan 34.54%
2nd U.S.A. 30.88% Japan 34.93% U.S.A. 32.12%
3rd Singapore 14.88% Singapore 14.01% Singapore 17.32%
4th Malaysia 8.57% Malaysia 7.87% Malaysia 8.86%
5th Taiwan 6.89% China 7.11% Hong Kong 7.15%
Sources) IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Various Issues. 
Notes 1)Trade with Taiwan is not included after 1998.
         2)Trade with Indonesia is not included in Singapore.Table 3 Theoretical weights of the exchange rates based on trade weights
- Malaysia and Singapore
(1) Theoretical weights before August 31, 1998
Malaysia ringit Singapore dollar
US dollar 0.443 0.540
Yen 0.376 0.328
(2) Theoretical weights after September 1, 1998
- The Case of the Singapore dollar
case 1 case 2 case 3
US dollar 0.700 0.719 0.705
Yen 0.221 0.205 0.213
Notes 1) The theoretical weights in (1) were calculated based on trade weights in 1997.
        2) After September 1st 1998, the theoretical weights in cases 1, 2, and 3 were 
          calculated based on the trade weights in 1997, 98, and 99 respectively.Table 4. The correlations of the Malaysia ringit with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.1997 0.9090 0.1896 1.863
(0.844) (5.480)
0.0479 0.8920 0.8226 0.1947 1.853
(0.185) (5.380) (1.422)
April 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.5244 0.6332 0.3044 2.426
(2.504) (5.125)
0.4255 0.6258 0.4093 0.3036 2.401
(1.814) (5.051) (0.939)
July 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.3353 0.5077 0.5562 2.619
(2.355) (4.599)
0.2889 0.5201 0.1447 0.5472 2.579
(1.641) (4.532) (0.456)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.Table 5. The correlations of the Singapore dollar with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
 - The estimations before and after September 1st 1998.
(a) The estimations before September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.4102 0.6547 0.5045 2.302
(4.255) (9.685)
0.3620 0.6492 0.2610 0.5052 2.311
(3.424) (9.586) (1.105)
April 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.4426 0.6221 0.6049 2.330
(4.109) (9.790)
0.3943 0.6185 0.1996 0.6041 2.344
(3.268) (9.704) (0.8905)
July 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.3893 0.6220 0.7849 2.212
(3.822) (7.875)
0.4398 0.6085 -0.1577 0.7820 2.252
(3.503) (7.438) (-0.697)
(b) The estimations after September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Oct. 1998 0.7959 0.1444 0.6086 2.457
(7.567) (2.422)
0.6692 0.1997 0.4610 0.6204 2.411
(4.988) (2.873) (1.486)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1998 0.7161 0.1619 0.6314 2.198
(10.857) (3.671)
0.5973 0.2036 0.4248 0.6451 2.183
(6.816) (4.244) (2.012)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1999 0.7825 0.1553 0.7755 2.115
(26.992) (7.537)
0.7368 0.1658 0.2316 0.7792 2.117
(21.741) (7.953) (2.546)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.Table 6. Theoretical weights of the Singapore dollar
- Correlations based on the estimates in Malaysia
(1) Theoretical weights based on the estimates from January 1998 to August 1998
case 1 case 2
US dollar 0.470 0.500
Yen 0.481 0.454
(2) Theoretical weights based on the estimates from July 1998 to August 1998
case 1 case 2
US dollar 0.509 0.537
Yen 0.366 0.354
Notes) The theoretical weights in cases 1 and 2 were calculated based on  
         the trade weights in 1997 and 98 respectively.
Table 7. Theoretical weights of the exchange rates based on trade weights
- The case of Thailand
(1) Theoretical weights before August 31, 1998
US dollar 0.427064344
Yen 0.468909222
(2) Theoretical weights after September 1, 1998
case 1 case 2 case 3
US dollar 0.498636763 0.540219458 0.532087734
Yen 0.420610829 0.37799448 0.382339891
Notes 1) The theoretical weights in (1) were calculated based on trade weights in 1997.
        2) After September 1st 1998, the theoretical weights in cases 1, 2, and 3 were 
          calculated  based on the trade weights in 1997, 98, and 99 respectively.Table 8. The correlations of the Thai baht with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
 - The estimations before and after September 1, 1998.
(a) The estimations before September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.1602 0.7460 0.1279 2.246
(0.664) (4.408)
0.0328 0.7317 0.6907 0.1298 2.257
(0.124) (4.318) (1.168)
April 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.3715 0.6966 0.2780 2.489
(1.660) (5.278)
0.2243 0.6855 0.6089 0.2831 2.495
(0.899) (5.202) (1.314)
July 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.5775 0.3615 0.4824 1.974
(3.385) (2.732)
0.5403 0.3714 0.1163 0.4704 1.995
(2.556) (2.697) (0.305)
(b) The estimations after September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Oct. 1998 0.9314 0.0833 0.5520 1.890
(7.074) (1.116)
0.9715 0.0658 -0.1459 0.5418 1.863
(5.633) (0.736) (-0.366)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1998 0.8406 0.0871 0.4814 1.912
(8.510) (1.319)
0.8181 0.0950 0.0807 0.4752 1.926
(6.081) (1.290) (0.249)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1999 0.8187 0.1408 0.5277 2.077
(15.680) (3.794)
0.7858 0.1483 0.1669 0.5277 2.091
(12.767) (3.919) (1.010)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.Table 9. The correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
 - The estimations allowing asymmetric responses
(a) The Case of Singapore
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen dummy*dollar dummy*Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1999 0.8232 0.1525 -0.3208 0.037 0.6581 2.336
(9.560) (2.504) (-1.861) (0.291)
0.7003 0.2026 -0.2790 0.003 0.3969 0.6517 2.288
(6.510) (3.087) (-1.630) (0.026) (1.874)
(b) The Case of Thailand
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen dummy*dollar dummy*Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1999 0.9556 0.0466 -0.3527 0.1288 0.4801 1.960
(7.303) (0.504) (-1.348) (0.670)
0.9480 0.0496 -0.3501 0.1267 0.0244 0.4734 1.970
(5.677) (0.487) (-1.318) (0.648) (0.074)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.
Table 10. The correlations with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
(a) The Case of Singapore
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2001 0.7966 0.2252 0.8827 2.091
(24.658) (7.832)
0.7856 0.2309 0.0728 0.8828 2.122
(23.291) (7.912) (1.123)
(b) The Case of Thailand
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 2000 - Dec. 2001 0.7688 0.2886 0.8174 2.400
(17.785) (7.498)
0.7667 0.2896 0.0135 0.8166 2.400
(16.945) (7.398) (0.156)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.Table 11. The correlations of the Korean Won with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
 - The estimations before and after September 1, 1998.
(a) The estimations before September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.8352 0.3778 0.1126 2.021
(3.184) (2.054)
0.6675 0.3590 0.9093 0.1181 2.031
(2.326) (1.953) (1.418)
July 1998 - Aug. 1998 1.1521 0.3143 0.3293 1.480
(3.252) (1.144)
1.1480 0.3154 0.013 0.3121 1.479
(2.612) (1.102) (0.016)
(b) The estimations after September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Oct. 1998 0.9612 0.2463 0.5379 1.708
(6.263) (2.832)
0.7442 0.3411 0.7896 0.5617 1.541
(3.844) (3.400) (1.764)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1998 1.0369 0.2411 0.5687 1.888
(9.511) (3.309)
1.0061 0.2519 0.1101 0.5637 1.876
(6.777) (3.100) (0.308)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses.Table 12. The correlations of the Philippine peso with the U.S. dollar and the Yen
 - The estimations before and after September 1, 1998.
(a) The estimations before September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Jan. 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.8462 0.5463 0.2693 2.286
(4.557) (4.195)
0.9077 0.5532 -0.3337 0.2672 2.276
(4.447) (4.231) (-0.732)
July 1998 - Aug. 1998 0.7133 0.2505 0.4498 1.853
(3.883) (1.758)
0.9609 0.1844 -0.7726 0.4870 1.734
(4.423) (1.303) (-1.973)
(b) The estimations after September 1st 1998
Sample period U.S. dollar Yen D. Mark adj.R2 D.W.
Sep. 1998 - Oct. 1998 1.0556 0.1880 0.7065 2.200
(9.382) (2.949)
1.3021 0.0804 -0.8970 0.7535 2.194
(9.751) (1.161) (-2.905)
Sep. 1998 - Dec. 1998 0.9402 0.2471 0.5194 2.283
(8.477) (3.334)
1.0053 0.2243 -0.2326 0.5158 2.281
(6.670) (2.718) (-0.640)
Note 1) t-values are in parentheses. 
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